Get StartedAI agents now assume cloud identity (IAM) roles, read storage, hit metadata endpoints, and act inside Kubernetes. Agentomy authorizes each action, bounds what an agent can reach, and keeps a tamper-evident record of what it did.
Every agent action against identity, storage, metadata, or Kubernetes is authorized before it runs, so an agent stays inside the roles and resources you scoped it to, not everything its credentials could technically reach.
Behavioral monitoring flags an agent that starts probing metadata endpoints, enumerating storage, or escalating its permissions, and quarantines it before a blast radius becomes a breach.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked log of what each agent did across your cloud, exportable to the framework your auditors care about.
Concrete ways an agent goes wrong here without governance, and the control that catches each one.
An agent reaches the cloud instance metadata endpoint to lift credentials, the move behind a breach that walked out with over a hundred million records. Authorization refuses the request and records it, so a server-side request does not become a credential theft.
An agent tries to grant itself access beyond the identity role it was given. Tier-gated authorization blocks the escalation server-side and logs it, so an agent cannot widen its own reach.
An agent is handed a storage token far broader than its task needs and begins enumerating buckets, the pattern that once exposed tens of terabytes. Scope-bounded authorization confines it to the storage its job actually requires.
An agent with cluster access starts issuing API calls outside its workload's scope. Authorization holds it to the namespaces and actions it was granted and records the attempt, so a foothold in one workload does not become the whole cluster.
A suspected compromise means cloud automation must stop now. One switch halts every governed agent in under a twentieth of a second, confirmed, and the halt holds through a restart.
Expand any framework to see what it means and what Agentomy provides.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked trail of every governance decision, exportable to the framework your auditors care about. No error codes; plain-English reasons for every allow and deny.
| Agent | Type | Status | Module | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| capacity-research-agent | Capacity | Active | RuntimeMonitor | 92 |
| incident-triage-agent | Incident | Active | AuditLogger | 88 |
| vendor-review-agent | Procurement | Monitored | PermissionRouter | 74 |
| cost-extract-agent | FinOps | Quarantined | HaltProtocol | 41 |
| policy-draft-agent | Policy | Monitored | EthicsConstraint | 79 |
| posture-report-agent | Reporting | Active | DecisionLog | 90 |
| Agent | Action | Policy | Result | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PermissionRouter | data_access_request | vendor-access | Blocked | 12:42:08 |
| AuditLogger | output_validation | audit-trail | Allowed | 12:41:54 |
| TrustScorer | policy_check | runtime-score | Allowed | 12:41:37 |
| RuntimeMonitor | behavior_drift | drift-threshold | Flagged | 12:40:58 |
| HaltProtocol | halt_initiated | unsafe-action | Blocked | 12:40:21 |
| EthicsConstraint | prompt_review | restricted-output | Flagged | 12:39:46 |
| DecisionLog | evidence_recorded | decision-proof | Allowed | 12:39:12 |
| Block | Timestamp | Agent | Action | Tier | Hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 46,860 | Today 12:42:08 | capacity-research-agent | data_access_request | Evaluator | 9c3b14dd64b362ec |
| 46,859 | Today 12:41:54 | incident-triage-agent | output_validation | Analyst | 0e8ec48598fc7eb8 |
| 46,858 | Today 12:41:37 | vendor-review-agent | policy_check | Builder | 0353472ffd4390b4 |
| 46,857 | Today 12:40:58 | cost-extract-agent | behavior_drift | Operator | 43992016436f043c |
| 46,856 | Today 12:40:21 | policy-draft-agent | halt_initiated | Strategist | 6976a9e9a355ca8e |
| 46,855 | Today 12:39:46 | posture-report-agent | prompt_review | Evaluator | 44e6384b9f5af56c |