Probing the metadata endpoint
An agent reaches the instance-metadata endpoint to pull the credentials attached to its host, the exact step that turned a request-forgery flaw into stolen IAM credentials in the canonical cloud breach.
Govern AI agents that provision, scale, and configure cloud infrastructure.
AI agents now operate cloud infrastructure directly: assuming identity and access management (IAM) roles, enumerating storage, querying instance-metadata endpoints, and running commands inside Kubernetes. The canonical cloud breach is the metadata-to-IAM-to-storage chain: in July 2019 an attacker used a server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw to reach an instance-metadata endpoint, took the credentials of an over-permissioned IAM role, and enumerated and exfiltrated storage holding records of more than 100 million people, with an $80M US federal penalty following. Every step in that chain is now an action an autonomous agent can take on its own, at machine speed and without a human pausing to ask whether it should. Posture and entitlement tools tell you what an identity is permitted to do; none govern whether this agent, right now, should be probing metadata, escalating a role, or listing every bucket, and none leave a tamper-evident record that survives the agent re-registering.
An agent reaches the instance-metadata endpoint to pull the credentials attached to its host, the exact step that turned a request-forgery flaw into stolen IAM credentials in the canonical cloud breach.
An agent chains IAM operations (assuming a higher role, creating an access key, attaching a policy) to climb from a read-only foothold to administrative reach across the account.
An agent enumerates buckets and objects far beyond its baseline, the reconnaissance that precedes mass exfiltration and that has repeatedly turned one over-broad credential into a large data exposure.
An agent with cluster access runs dangerous operations (pod exec, a privileged container, a cluster-role binding), the container-escape and lateral-movement primitives that ordinary posture scanning never sees in real time.
Each action is checked against the agent's tier and scope before it runs. A read-only agent cannot perform IAM operations, reach storage outside its scope, or exec into Kubernetes; permitted reads pass, escalation is blocked.
Behavioral detectors flag metadata probing, IAM privilege escalation, storage enumeration, Kubernetes abuse, and credentials surfacing in an agent's output, and auto-quarantine an agent that drifts from a read-only baseline toward admin.
A single halt blocks further cloud operations across the governed fleet, returns the affected agent count, and persists an audit reference for forensic reconstruction.
Credential access, metadata probes, and storage enumeration each produce a tamper-evident, hash-linked audit block, retrievable per agent and surviving the agent re-registering. Denials are logged, not just failures.
Agentomy carries a dedicated CLOUD pattern family for Cloud Infrastructure Governance. Each one is a specific failure this layer watches for, with the signal it watches, checked at runtime before the action reaches your systems.
DetectionMonitor for access to the instance-metadata service (IMDS) endpoint.
DetectionTrack IAM operations per agent against its authorized tier.
DetectionWatch Kubernetes API operations for exec into pods, privileged or host-namespace containers, and cluster-role bindings.
DetectionScan agent output for credential material.
DetectionCheck every consequential cloud actuation (provision, delete, IAM change, bucket-policy change) against the boundary registered for that agent before it fires.
DetectionDifferentiate surgical actions (single resource, low downstream impact) from systemic ones (region-wide, recursive, or mass changes) and gate the systemic class behind an elevated, named authorization.
DetectionCompare storage list and enumerate operations against the agent's authorized scope and historical baseline.
DetectionInspect the effective scope of each agent's credential for wildcard actions or resources and admin-equivalent roles, and flag scope that exceeds the agent's registered least-privilege need.
DetectionMaintain a per-agent behavioral baseline and flag a shift from a read-only operation profile toward write and administrative operations, auto-quarantining an agent that drifts toward admin.
DetectionAttribute multi-account actions across the account boundary so a cross-account actuation is tied to the originating agent and operator, and reconstructable end to end.
CLOUD family, CLOUD-001 to CLOUD-010 · 10 of 166 governance patterns Agentomy enforces at runtime. Severity as classified in the pattern definition.
Agentomy does not certify you. It gives you the enforcement and the audit trail these frameworks ask for, so readiness is something you can show rather than assert.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked trail of every governance decision for this workload: what an agent did, under whose authorization, and why. Plain-English reasons for every allow and deny, exportable to the framework your auditors care about.
| Agent | Type | Status | Module | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| capacity-research-agent | Capacity | Active | RuntimeMonitor | 92 |
| incident-triage-agent | Incident | Active | AuditLogger | 88 |
| vendor-review-agent | Procurement | Monitored | PermissionRouter | 74 |
| cost-extract-agent | FinOps | Quarantined | HaltProtocol | 41 |
| policy-draft-agent | Policy | Monitored | EthicsConstraint | 79 |
| posture-report-agent | Reporting | Active | DecisionLog | 90 |
| Agent | Action | Policy | Result | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PermissionRouter | data_access_request | vendor-access | Blocked | 12:42:08 |
| AuditLogger | output_validation | audit-trail | Allowed | 12:41:54 |
| TrustScorer | policy_check | runtime-score | Allowed | 12:41:37 |
| RuntimeMonitor | behavior_drift | drift-threshold | Flagged | 12:40:58 |
| HaltProtocol | halt_initiated | unsafe-action | Blocked | 12:40:21 |
| EthicsConstraint | prompt_review | restricted-output | Flagged | 12:39:46 |
| DecisionLog | evidence_recorded | decision-proof | Allowed | 12:39:12 |
| Block | Timestamp | Agent | Action | Tier | Hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45,077 | Today 12:42:08 | capacity-research-agent | data_access_request | Evaluator | a0dd50386975746a |
| 45,076 | Today 12:41:54 | incident-triage-agent | output_validation | Analyst | fe521da4fce5dc70 |
| 45,075 | Today 12:41:37 | vendor-review-agent | policy_check | Builder | e564c48d1a44cb68 |
| 45,074 | Today 12:40:58 | cost-extract-agent | behavior_drift | Operator | 02750aced88d667b |
| 45,073 | Today 12:40:21 | policy-draft-agent | halt_initiated | Strategist | df62ab2efbe99a68 |
| 45,072 | Today 12:39:46 | posture-report-agent | prompt_review | Evaluator | 3ee5d9f97669a9fd |