The shadow agent nobody logged
A department stands up an AI assistant against the permitting system using a spare service account. IT has no record it exists, no idea it can also read HR files, and no way to see what it has done.
Govern AI agents acting on internal city and county systems (permitting, records, HR, benefits) with shadow-agent discovery, least-privilege, and public-records retention built in.
The quiet frontier of public-sector AI is internal. Agents are being wired into the back-office systems a city or county runs on: permitting and licensing, records management, human resources, and benefits administration. These systems hold resident data and drive decisions that affect people's livelihoods, and they are exactly where an over-permissioned or undiscovered agent does the most damage with the least visibility. Without governance, IT has no inventory of which agents can reach which systems, no enforced least-privilege boundary, and no retention of the automated actions that public-records law says must be producible.
A department stands up an AI assistant against the permitting system using a spare service account. IT has no record it exists, no idea it can also read HR files, and no way to see what it has done.
A records-summarization agent is given broad database access for convenience. It can read benefits and personnel records it never needed, and one prompt away is a data exposure the county cannot see coming.
An agent adjusts a benefits eligibility record. Months later a resident appeals, and the county cannot show what changed, when, on whose authority, or why, exactly the record public-records law expects it to hold.
Automated actions on official records are never captured for retention, so a routine public-records request comes back incomplete and the agency cannot even tell what it is missing.
Continuously inventory every agent and service account touching internal systems, including the ones a department stood up without telling IT. Anything unregistered is confined to read-only until it is authorized.
Each agent is scoped to exactly the systems and actions its job requires. A permitting agent cannot read HR files; a records agent cannot write to benefits. Tier-based permissions enforce the boundary on every request.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked log captures every automated read and write to permitting, records, HR, and benefits (what the agent touched, under whose authorization, and why), retained so it can answer a public-records request.
Per-agent behavioral baselines flag an agent that starts reaching outside its lane, with auto-quarantine and a one-switch halt across all internal integrations.
Agentomy does not certify you. It gives you the enforcement and the audit trail these frameworks ask for, so readiness is something you can show rather than assert.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked trail of every governance decision for this workload: what an agent did, under whose authorization, and why. Plain-English reasons for every allow and deny, exportable to the framework your auditors care about.
| Agent | Type | Status | Module | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| casework-research-agent | Casework | Active | RuntimeMonitor | 92 |
| resident-triage-agent | Constituent services | Active | AuditLogger | 88 |
| contract-review-agent | Procurement | Monitored | PermissionRouter | 74 |
| benefits-extract-agent | Benefits | Quarantined | HaltProtocol | 41 |
| records-draft-agent | Records | Monitored | EthicsConstraint | 79 |
| transparency-report-agent | Reporting | Active | DecisionLog | 90 |
| Agent | Action | Policy | Result | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PermissionRouter | data_access_request | vendor-access | Blocked | 12:42:08 |
| AuditLogger | output_validation | audit-trail | Allowed | 12:41:54 |
| TrustScorer | policy_check | runtime-score | Allowed | 12:41:37 |
| RuntimeMonitor | behavior_drift | drift-threshold | Flagged | 12:40:58 |
| HaltProtocol | halt_initiated | unsafe-action | Blocked | 12:40:21 |
| EthicsConstraint | prompt_review | restricted-output | Flagged | 12:39:46 |
| DecisionLog | evidence_recorded | decision-proof | Allowed | 12:39:12 |
| Block | Timestamp | Agent | Action | Tier | Hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44,417 | Today 12:42:08 | casework-research-agent | data_access_request | Evaluator | e06e9139bfbebb8a |
| 44,416 | Today 12:41:54 | resident-triage-agent | output_validation | Analyst | f00ff9ba27cfcb31 |
| 44,415 | Today 12:41:37 | contract-review-agent | policy_check | Builder | cdbc71c870d5a870 |
| 44,414 | Today 12:40:58 | benefits-extract-agent | behavior_drift | Operator | d432301482fb9526 |
| 44,413 | Today 12:40:21 | records-draft-agent | halt_initiated | Strategist | 8fa860ef5d84e23d |
| 44,412 | Today 12:39:46 | transparency-report-agent | prompt_review | Evaluator | dc53dd5ae72a154c |