A disputed change
A record shows an altered medication entry. Was it a clinician, an agent, or an error? Standard logs cannot prove which, or rule out that the log itself was edited after the incident.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked record of every AI-agent read and write to a patient record, so a health system can prove who, or what, touched a record and why.
When an AI agent reads or writes a patient record, a health system needs to answer a simple question with certainty: who, or what, touched this record, when, and why? Ordinary application logs do not carry that weight. They can be edited, they rarely tie an action to a specific agent and its authorizing operator, and they cannot prove they were not altered after the fact. As agents increasingly touch records directly, the gap between what happened and what can be proven becomes a legal and clinical liability. Chain of custody closes it: an unbroken, tamper-evident history of every agent access to a record.
A record shows an altered medication entry. Was it a clinician, an agent, or an error? Standard logs cannot prove which, or rule out that the log itself was edited after the incident.
After a suspected inappropriate access, investigators need an unbroken account of every touch on the affected records. The existing logs have gaps and no integrity guarantee, so the investigation cannot reach a defensible conclusion.
An agent's action is recorded against a shared service account, so the record trail points at a system rather than the operator who authorized the agent to act.
In a compliance review or legal matter, the health system offers its access logs as evidence, but cannot demonstrate the logs are complete and unaltered, so their evidentiary value collapses.
Every agent read and write to a patient record is recorded as an event (the agent, the authorizing operator, the record, the action, the timestamp, and the reason), with no path for an agent to act on a record off the record.
Each event is cryptographically hash-linked to the one before it, so any later edit, deletion, or insertion breaks the chain and is detectable. The history is tamper-evident by construction, not by policy.
Every agent action ties back to a named operator and an authorization tier, so the trail points at who stood behind the agent, never at an anonymous shared account.
For any patient record, export a complete, verifiable custody history, readable in plain English, for a breach investigation, a compliance review, or a legal request.
Agentomy does not certify you. It gives you the enforcement and the audit trail these frameworks ask for, so readiness is something you can show rather than assert.
A tamper-evident, hash-linked trail of every governance decision for this workload: what an agent did, under whose authorization, and why. Plain-English reasons for every allow and deny, exportable to the framework your auditors care about.
| Agent | Type | Status | Module | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| clinical-research-agent | Research | Active | RuntimeMonitor | 92 |
| patient-intake-agent | Intake | Active | AuditLogger | 88 |
| supplier-review-agent | Procurement | Monitored | PermissionRouter | 74 |
| claims-extract-agent | Claims | Quarantined | HaltProtocol | 41 |
| consent-draft-agent | Compliance | Monitored | EthicsConstraint | 79 |
| care-report-agent | Reporting | Active | DecisionLog | 90 |
| Agent | Action | Policy | Result | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PermissionRouter | data_access_request | vendor-access | Blocked | 12:42:08 |
| AuditLogger | output_validation | audit-trail | Allowed | 12:41:54 |
| TrustScorer | policy_check | runtime-score | Allowed | 12:41:37 |
| RuntimeMonitor | behavior_drift | drift-threshold | Flagged | 12:40:58 |
| HaltProtocol | halt_initiated | unsafe-action | Blocked | 12:40:21 |
| EthicsConstraint | prompt_review | restricted-output | Flagged | 12:39:46 |
| DecisionLog | evidence_recorded | decision-proof | Allowed | 12:39:12 |
| Block | Timestamp | Agent | Action | Tier | Hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44,097 | Today 12:42:08 | clinical-research-agent | data_access_request | Evaluator | f6fb236d15ca4d56 |
| 44,096 | Today 12:41:54 | patient-intake-agent | output_validation | Analyst | 114028b1f26d3b9d |
| 44,095 | Today 12:41:37 | supplier-review-agent | policy_check | Builder | c9637ea14d36a174 |
| 44,094 | Today 12:40:58 | claims-extract-agent | behavior_drift | Operator | 53935fd9bc1620ad |
| 44,093 | Today 12:40:21 | consent-draft-agent | halt_initiated | Strategist | 04be10ba09ad3ad9 |
| 44,092 | Today 12:39:46 | care-report-agent | prompt_review | Evaluator | 114b932d9eaebb4f |